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DIMITRI UZNADZE ABOUT THE CAESAR

Unknown Dimitri Uznadze: Unveiling His Contribution to Historical Science Dimitri.

Uznadze's contribution to historical science, largely obscured during the totalitarian-Bolshevik regime, has remained relatively unknown to Georgian society. In the Soviet era, it was a taboo subject, silenced and untouched, as discussing it was considered political audacity. This indifference wasn't accidental; it extended beyond academic boundaries, carrying a distinct political content. Primarily, it reflected a negative attitude toward the achievements of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) during the Soviet period. It was a highly politicized and ideological approach. In an attempt to correct this inconsistency, we aim to shift the focus from political judgment to academic reasoning.

The altered political landscape has brought the revival and rehabilitation of this topic to the forefront. We have chosen to delve into a special study of Dimitri Uznadze's contribution to historical science. This endeavor will unveil another facet of his multifaceted and diverse activities, adding a new, albeit modest, but interesting dimension. This undertaking is crucial for filling in more gaps in Georgian historiography, offering a more comprehensive understanding of Dimitri Uznadze's scientific pursuits.

This paper represents a step in this direction. As indicated by the title, it is of a historiographical nature, intending to explore how Caesar's work was presented in Dimitri Uznadze's initial national school textbook on ancient world history. The focus is on Uznadze's approach to Caesar, and we find it both interesting and pertinent to delve into this issue. This work serves as news, bearing a Georgian context, and stands as the initial attempt to address the mentioned subject.

Exploring Caesar in Dimitri Uznadze's Early Textbook on Ancient World History.

Every era is closely tied to remarkable individuals, often described by English historian Arnold Toynbee as the "creative minority." Among such

figures, Roman Gaius Julius Caesar (100-44 BC) stands out prominently. In this context, it becomes intriguing to examine how Caesar's contributions were portrayed in Dimitri Uznadze's initial national school textbook on ancient world history (1.6 3-73).

Assessing Caesar in Historical Literature: Perspectives and Challenges.

Caesar's legacy has been extensively documented in literature, revealing a lack of consensus among ancient authors and historians regarding the evaluation of his work. The majority, as acknowledged, laud and extol his name and achievements, while a minority takes on the role of critics, demonstrating, at best, an indifferent attitude toward his contributions. Uniting these contrasting perspectives poses a formidable challenge, and this ongoing debate is likely to persist. In the words of renowned Dutch historian Peter Hale, "History is an endless polemic," implying an enduring clash between pro-Caesar and anti-Caesar viewpoints. Striking a balance between these extremes proves difficult due to the inherent subjectivity of judges evaluating Caesar's work, with some swayed by sympathy and others by antipathy.

The foundation for Caesar's glorification was established in antiquity, primarily through the works of Plutarch and Suetonius. Another perspective, highlighted by historian Givi Gamrekelli, emphasizes the apparent indifference to Caesar exhibited by historian Ammianus Marcellinus. The 19th-20th centuries witnessed widespread glorification of Caesar in European historiography. A notable advocate was the eminent German historian Theodor Mommsen, who dedicated a significant portion of his works, particularly the third volume, to an apology for Caesar. Mommsen's admiration for Caesar reached its zenith, presenting him as unparalleled in world history. While acknowledging the rational aspects of Mommsen's assessment, it is imperative to approach the glorification of Caesar with caution to avoid exaggeration and strive for moderation.

Similarly, the renowned German military historian Hans Delbrück expressed a high regard for Caesar's work, praising him as a military genius and highlighting his military triumphs. Delbrück's work concludes with an apotheosis of Caesar's achievements, declaring him the epitome of ancient military art. However, the cautionary note remains – glorifying Caesar's work demands a measured approach to maintain historical accuracy and avoid undue exaggeration.

Diverse Perspectives on Caesar: Critical Voices and Glorification.

Guillermo Ferrero, the renowned Italian historian, emerges as a vocal critic of the Caesar cult, going to the extent of labeling Caesar a "genius adventurer" and sparing no negative epithets in assessing his work.

Literary literature also reflects the dichotomy in perspectives, with William Shakespeare's play "Julius Caesar" embodying the glorification of

Caesar. Notably, the spectrum of Caesar's supporters extends to prominent politicians, including the French emperor Napoleon III (1852-1870), both known for their advocacy of one-man rule.

These contrasting views encapsulate the main trends in the historiography of Caesar, highlighting the divergence between critics like Ferrero and those who glorify Caesar, such as Shakespeare and influential political figures like Napoleon III. The complexity of evaluating Caesar's work is evident in the diverse opinions that have shaped the narrative, contributing to the ongoing debate on his historical significance.

Caesaria in Georgia: Correcting Historical Distortions.

This paper comprises two interconnected parts, each integral to understanding the complex relationship between Georgia's interest in Caesar's work and its portrayal in Dimitri Uznadze's first national school textbook of ancient world history.

The first part, dubbed "Georgian Caesaria" or simply "Caesaria," offers a concise overview of Georgia's historical interest in Caesar's work. This exploration serves as a crucial component of the broader issue at hand. The second part delves into the specific inquiry of how Caesar's work is covered in Uznadze's textbook.

Our focus is on the interest in Caesar's work in Georgia, a topic that has undergone distortion primarily due to the influence of the totalitarian-Bolshevik regime. The prevailing Soviet approach inaccurately claimed that no substantial writings on Caesar existed in Georgia until after its Sovietization in 1921. This skewed perspective completely disregarded the significant contributions made during the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921), effectively erasing this period from the historical narrative.

In challenging this distorted view, we aim to emphasize the importance of the first national school textbooks of ancient world history published during the Democratic Republic of Georgia. While acknowledging that these early initiatives may not have been extensive, they represent a noteworthy step forward, particularly considering the limited literature on Caesar in Georgian.

It is crucial to resist exaggerating the significance of these early efforts in 1918-1921. Instead, we view them as laying the foundation, setting the principles, and marking the initial signs of scholarly engagement with Caesar's work in Georgia. The scientific approach presented in these textbooks provides a transparent basis for understanding this historical matter. Dismissing these early developments with a nihilistic attitude would be unwarranted, as they represent the groundwork for a more comprehensive exploration of Georgia's interest in Caesar's work.

Evolution of Interest in Caesar's Work in Georgia: A Historical Perspective.

Between 1918 and 1921, interest in Caesar's work took on a cognitive and popular character in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. This interest found expression in the first national school textbooks of ancient world history, marking a significant achievement for the time. Despite the limited scope, these textbooks laid the groundwork for future explorations, challenging the Soviet-era narrative that portrayed Georgian historiography as starting from scratch post-Sovietization.

Contrary to the Soviet claim, Georgian historiography had a pre-existing foundation, and the accomplishments in the early 20th century were unfairly disregarded. The Georgian scholars of the time made valuable contributions, and their efforts should be acknowledged as a success.

The trajectory of this interest in Caesar's work in Georgia suggests a multi-step plan that unfolded in three stages. The first stage, represented by the national school textbooks, demonstrated a popularization and educational initiative. The logical continuation, the second stage, might have involved a university-level textbook building on the foundation laid earlier. The third stage would likely have entailed a combination of scientific research and further popularization, creating a more comprehensive understanding of Caesar's work.

However, political conflicts disrupted this plan, and the original path was abandoned. Instead, the Soviet-era historiography adopted a one-sided, dogmatic Marxist-Leninist ideology that stifled diverse opinions and scientific exploration. This ideological approach underestimated individual contributions and magnified the role of collective forces.

The narrative propagated during the Soviet years, suggesting a uniform and monotonous interest in Caesar's work in Georgia, does not hold. Instead, there was a dynamic metamorphosis, a zigzagging journey from free thinking to ideological monopoly and back to free thinking.

Crucially, the irreversible shift in interest occurred not after the Sovietization of Georgia but earlier, during 1918-1921 in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The work on the first national school textbooks of ancient world history during this period signifies a significant qualitative and quantitative change in the study of Caesar's work in Georgia. Acknowledging these achievements is essential to understanding the multifaceted nature of Georgia's historical engagement with Caesar's legacy.

Shaping the Study of Caesar's Work in Georgia: A Historical Analysis.

The inception of serious teaching about ancient world history, particularly Caesar's work, in Georgian schools occurred not after the Sovietization of Georgia, as claimed in the Soviet era, but much earlier—between 1918 and 1921 in the Democratic Republic of Georgia. The significance lies in the development of the first national school textbooks that encouraged

free thinking, a multivariate approach to historical events, and progressive-liberal values. While acknowledging the merits of these textbooks, it's important to recognize their contextual nuances, avoiding an apologetic tone.

These textbooks marked a substantial advancement from the black-reactionary educational materials used under Tsarism, presenting a more progressive and inclusive approach. Notably, the teaching of ancient world history in Georgian schools now acquired a national dimension by being conducted in the Georgian language—a crucial development that should not be solely justified as the Soviet regime did.

Georgian historiography demonstrates a tradition of interest in Caesar's work, combining research and popularization of the subject. The achievements of Georgian historiography in this domain, in our view, stand on par with or even exceed those of many small European countries. This reality, without exaggeration or downplaying, provides a more accurate understanding of Georgia's contribution to the study of ancient history.

The study of Caesar's work in Georgia can be conditionally divided into three periods, transcending purely academic contexts and carrying distinct political undertones:

Interest in Caesar's Work (1918-1921): During the Democratic Republic of Georgia, this period laid the foundation for the study of ancient history, introducing a more liberal and nationalistic approach.

Study and Popularization (1921-1991): The Soviet period saw efforts to study and popularize Caesar's work within the framework of a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist ideology, limiting diverse perspectives.

Post-Soviet Coverage (Early '90s Onward): With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet period ushered in a new era of studying Caesar's work in Georgian historiography, characterized by greater academic freedom and a more nuanced understanding.

This historical analysis aims to shed light on the evolution of interest in Caesar's work in Georgia, emphasizing the multifaceted nature of this exploration across different political and educational contexts.

Dimitri Uznadze's Perspective on Caesar's Work: A Historical Inquiry.

Dimitri Uznadze's coverage of Caesar's work in the first national school textbook of ancient world history reveals a nuanced perspective, delving into both empirical facts and historiographical evaluation. Two key questions guide our exploration: the depth of Uznadze's knowledge about Caesar's life and work and his evaluative stance towards Caesar.

1. Empirical Side: Uznadze's Informed Knowledge

Dimitri Uznadze exhibits a solid grasp of Caesar's rule, showcasing a factual understanding of Caesar's life and accomplishments. This empir-

ical foundation is a significant strength of Uznadze's discussion on the topic, affirming his historical knowledge.

2. Theoretical Side: Historiographic Evaluation

Uznadze aligns with the prevailing positive assessment of Caesar's work found in historical-scientific literature. His approach is characterized as correct and scientific, reflecting the scholarly consensus of his time. This historiographical evaluation aligns with the established standards of historical science during that period.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Uznadze's Evaluation:

Uznadze's positive stance towards Caesar's work is marked by a certain emotional intensity. While this fervor adds passion to the discussion, caution is warranted to prevent hyperbolization and excessive praise. The emotional tone might be attributed to Uznadze's worldview and political ideals.

Possible Influences on Uznadze's Perspective:

It's speculated that Uznadze's views may have been influenced by prominent historians of his time, such as Theodor Mommsen. While this remains a cautious assumption, it suggests the interconnectedness of historical ideas and perspectives.

Understanding Uznadze's Worldview:

Uznadze's exaggerated tone is likely rooted in the alignment of Caesar's work with his political ideals and a recognition of the individual's role in history. This emphasis on the significance of the individual aligns with Uznadze's broader worldview, echoing the sentiments of Georgian historians like Alexander Tsereteli.

Limitations of the Knowledge Base:

The available information is confined to the first national school textbook of ancient world history, offering a limited glimpse into Uznadze's insights on Caesar. Despite its scarcity, this source remains valuable, providing fragments that hint at Uznadze's broader knowledge on the subject.

Cautious Assumption about Uznadze's Extensive Knowledge:

Recognizing the paucity of available material, there's a cautious assumption that Uznadze possessed a more extensive understanding of Caesar's work beyond what is evident in the textbook section. This speculation acknowledges the potential depth of Uznadze's knowledge.

In conclusion, Uznadze's exploration of Caesar's work, while constrained by limited available material, offers valuable insights into his historical perspective. Balancing empirical knowledge with historiographical evaluation, Uznadze's stance contributes to the broader landscape of Georgian historiography.

Firstly, it's crucial to choose the right criterion. This is significant and will help us assess the issue properly. A strict scientific measure won't work as a criterion here; it's a school textbook. A much more modest task

lay ahead. Share Caesar's activities with the students in an interesting way – that was the challenge. Dimitri Uznadze succeeded in this cultural task. This bit of information about Caesar's work would interest Georgian society, especially the student youth, shaping a common perception on this issue. That was the main goal. Judging this reasoning strictly from today's perspective wouldn't be appropriate. Dimitri Uznadze contributed to teaching, studying, and popularizing Caesar's work in Georgia, along with Alexander Tsereteli, as initiators of coverage on this topic in the region. In fact, this is one of the first attempts to cover Caesar's work in Georgia.

Gaius Julius Caesar. The First Triumvirate. Caesar in Gaul (58-49), Battle of Caesar and Pompey. The age of Caesar's rule. That's all. What about this plan? This plan is good, and we don't see anything unacceptable in it. It would be desirable to organize the issue more compactly, even following a straightforward scheme. Caesar's Domestic Policy. His reforms and Caesar's foreign policy. His triumphant military successes. As we can see, scientific research here doesn't have a principled character; it's more a matter of taste. He likes it that way. We understand it a little differently.

It would be good to mention the years of Caesar's work (100-44 BC), adding cognitive load to help students deepen their knowledge. The date of his death is indicated (March 15, 44 BC), but the years of his work are not. It would be much more consistent to do so.

Dimitri Uznadze's attempt to combine empirical, factual knowledge of the material and the correct attitude towards Caesar's work is one of the main merits of his discussion. In fact, we are dealing with a scientific approach to the issue, which naturally has its pluses and minuses. Therefore, an apologetic assessment of this reasoning, or even underestimation, would not be appropriate. We should not swing from one extreme to the other. The truth usually lies somewhere in the middle. We tried to understand the complexity of Dimitri Uznadze's views on this topic and explain the reasons for it as much as possible. This is the scientific approach to the issue.

This is how Dimitri Uznadze begins his story about Caesar: "At that time, Crassus and Julius Caesar played a particularly important role in Rome (meaning the 60s before BC). Crassus was never reconciled to Pompey and worked against him during the latter's stay in the East. He (i.e., Crassus - MK) formed a close connection with the young Caesar, who later played a big role, and along with him enjoyed the anarchy caused by Catiline's conspiracy. Caesar was a relative of Marius and had served in the army during Sulla's dictatorship. When Sulla died, he entered the political arena and gained general attention for his eloquence and the celebrations he arranged to win the hearts of the people. He joined the Democratic Party and wanted to seize power together with Crassus. But Pompey, who had just finished his work in the East and was returning with his famous

army, considered him the most dangerous, not only for him but also for the Senate (1.63-64).

Let's start with the fact that Dimitri Uznadze seems quite informed about the political situation in Rome. He shows insight into the issue, a logical result of empirical, factual, material knowledge. This is obviously good, but more specifics would be desirable. This reasoning leaves a general impression. Here we are just going to say that we do not rule out the possibility of enriching its content. He chose a different path. One question arises here: to what extent was this a biography of Caesar? In this regard, we feel a little inadequate.

Caesar entered the political arena for the first time in 68 BC, actively participating in the political life of Rome. At different times, he held various positions: quaestor, aedile, high priest, praetor, and consul (9.41-71, 10.15-29, 14.20-32, 15.9-29).

The milestone of 60 years before BC is crucial in Caesar's work. The first triumvirate, consisting of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, was created. Therefore, the first triumvirate is highlighted in the manual, and its separation is completely justified (1.64-65). The days of the Republic are numbered, and the first signs of the establishment of sole rule are gradually emerging, with Caesar emerging as the successor of Sulla.

An allusion to Caesar's attitude towards Catiline's conspiracy in 62 BC is interesting and relevant, sparking differences of opinion among historians. He seems to have sided with scholars who believed that "Caesar, together with Crassus, sought to take advantage of the anarchy caused by the Catalina plot." Caesar attempted to use Catalina's plot to his advantage, having a distinctive approach to gaining power, markedly different from Catiline's. The conspiracy had its leader in Catiline, excluding Caesar's involvement, as it was not in his character. He sought to be the first in everything, everywhere, and had far-reaching plans. "Caesar had far-reaching plans, and it is hard to believe that he would have been content with an invisible role in Catiline's conspiracy. He had his path marked out and consistently fought to achieve his goal" (15.18-19).

This concludes the first part of Dimitri Uznadze's guide, leading to the second part, the triumvirate. Uznadze wrote, "Everyone, especially the senate, awaited anxiously for Pompey's return. The senate, where Cato the Younger played a significant role, the last honest representative of the interests of the old republic, rejected the proposal of Pompey's supporters to elect him consul for 61 years and keep his army. Regardless of whether Pompey landed at Brundisium, he immediately disbanded the army as required by law. This circumstance turned Pompey into an insignificant figure, no longer feared by anyone. Therefore, the senate did not approve any decrees for his arrangements in the East, nor did they satisfy his former soldiers (veterans). Pompey regretted dismissing the army, but

it was too late” (1.64).

We fully agree with Dimitri Uznadze when he does not consider it appropriate to overload the textbook with historical facts, emphasizing that crucial facts should not be omitted. He makes the right move by pointing out to the students the date of the creation of the First Triumvirate in 60 BC. Emphasizing Pompey’s mistake, which weakened him, he should not have dismissed the army.

“Meanwhile, Julius Caesar, who had been in Spain as praetor, returned to his homeland and secretly agreed with Crassus and Pompey about a common action and the distribution of the dominions of the country. This led to the creation of the first triumvirate, in which Caesar was to be elected consul in 59 and then sent to govern some province. Pompey’s veterans were to be given lands and to approve all the decrees that Pompey had made in Asia. Additionally, to strengthen this relationship, Caesar betrothed his wife Julia to Pompey. Despite the opposition of the Optimates, Caesar was indeed elected consul, and he began to act energetically. He completely bypassed the Senate and decided everything through the People’s Assembly. As promised, he approved in a popular assembly Pompey’s edicts in Asia and passed an agrarian law primarily to satisfy Pompey’s veterans. The Senate tried to resist, but Caesar first removed both important Senate forces: Cato, who was sent to Cyprus on a special assignment, and Cicero, who was exiled from Rome. The victory remained on his side, and according to the resolution of the popular assembly, Caesar was given the Gallia of Cisalpinia to rule and was given the chief command of the army there. The Senate, in turn, attached Transalpine Gaul to Cisalpinia, present-day southern France, to reserve the right to seize it later” (1.64-65).

Ancient authors referred to the triumvirate as “the three-headed beast” symbolizing power (Pompey), money (Crassus), and intellect (Caesar). It would be desirable if Dimitri Uznadze’s textbook emphasized this, adding a cognitive load that could engage students and enhance their understanding. This would enrich the content of this section of the manual, earning valuable points.

“After this, Pompey and Crassus again aligned with Caesar, with Pompey receiving Spain, and Crassus obtaining Syria. Pompey did not personally go to Spain but sent representatives (legates) there, gaining almost complete dictatorial power by aligning with the Optimates. Crassus, already wealthy (even his money belonged to the Senate), left for Syria to strengthen his property. In an attempt to combat the powerful Parthians, Crassus initiated a war but was defeated and killed, resulting in the dissolution of the triumvirate. Pompey reconciled with the Senate, while Caesar remained alone” (1.65).

This reasoning is interesting and rich in empirical, factual material knowledge. Uznadze accurately presents historical facts, leaving no room for doubt about his awareness and understanding of the events.

It seems Dimitri Uznadze supported the opinion expressed in historical scientific literature and was well aware of the power dynamics within the triumvirate. As the leader of the triumvirate, Caesar, whom he held in high regard, successfully maneuvered between Pompey and Crassus. Uznadze suggests Caesar exhibited remarkable flexibility.

Being an ardent supporter of Caesar, Uznadze naturally showed no sympathy toward Pompey and Crassus. His favorite hero was Caesar, a perspective aligned with the common viewpoint in scientific literature at the beginning of the 20th century.

“Pompey fled to Egypt, where he was brutally killed in an attempt to win Caesar’s favor.” This marked the tragic end of a man whose fate imposed a much greater role than he was capable of. Fate, however, often elevated individuals of modest talent to historical significance (1-68).

The second part of Dimitri Uznadze’s school textbook concludes, and the third part begins – Caesar in Gaul. Its chronological framework spans the years 58-49 BC, a commendable organization. In Caesar’s plans, the conquest of Gaul played a significant role in his struggle for power (9.114-157, 10.100-124, 14.157-162, 15.29-40).

Here, Uznadze covers various topics, including the geographical location, population, legal structure, existing regulations, customs, trade, and the conflict between Rome and Gaul. This provides a solid historical background for delving into the main issue. It essentially offers a brief history of Gaul before Caesar’s campaign, emphasizing that during the war, Caesar employed the famous policy of “seize and conquer,” leveraging the internal differences among the Gauls to his advantage. “When Caesar appeared in Gaul, the country was greatly weakened by domestic dissensions, yet Caesar never had more than six legions. Despite this, he bravely set about subduing it. His goal was twofold: complete subjugation of Gaul and the creation of a battle-hardened army to dominate Rome. Caesar accomplished both goals over eight years” (1.66). Uznadze effectively conveys the situation in Gaul before Caesar’s invasion and his objectives.

The war with the Gauls is given minimal space – just one paragraph spanning 19 lines. This seems inadequate and equivalent to ignoring the issue. The historical background appears to dominate the main theme, leaving a feeling of inadequacy and prompting further discussion.

In Dimitri Uznadze’s textbook, he states, “First, he had to contend with the Helvetii, who had to leave their homeland (Switzerland) and invade Gaul. Caesar defeated Ignatius and drove him back. The battle with the Germanic tribes, led by Ariovistus, who crossed the Rhine and surrounded Gaul, was particularly perilous. Caesar not only repelled Ignis but also

crossed the Rhine himself, instilling fear in the Germanic tribes. Subduing smaller Gaulish tribes was easier. When publicans in Gaul acted peculiarly, the entire region united in a mighty rebellion. However, the bravery of the Gauls proved fruitless against Caesar's military genius, forcing their leader, Vercingetorix, to submit willingly. From this point, Rome's influence gradually solidified in Gaul, and the country soon became a Roman province. It's worth noting that during his imprisonment, Caesar also moved to Britain, spreading the fear of Roman weapons there as well" (1.66).

Uznadze exhibits considerable awareness in this matter, reflecting empirical, factual knowledge of the material, including Caesar's writings about the Gaulish War. His indifference towards historical facts is a weak point in this section. While he provides the date of Caesar's march into Gaul as 58-49 BC, he omits subsequent dates. While we agree that overloading the textbook with dates should be avoided, mentioning key dates, like Caesar's victory over Vercingetorix in 52 BC, is crucial.

It would be desirable to acknowledge that Caesar was the historian behind "On the War with the Gauls," offering a connection to his literary activity that could interest students and enrich the section. An allusion to this is made in the discussion of Caesar's literary activity, but it lacks specificity.

Uznadze doesn't overlook Caesar's invasion of Britain but fails to specify the date (55-54 BC). Highlighting this important date should not be ignored.

Moving to the fourth section, the confrontation with Pompey played a significant role in Caesar's rise. Without defeating Pompey, Caesar's ascension to power would have been impossible. This struggle for power and supremacy defines the unfavorable character of the clash.

In our opinion, this part of Uznadze's textbook, alongside the Gallic War, is the most interesting. It accurately conveys historical events, reflecting empirical, factual material knowledge, and discusses them, echoing views from scientific literature. Uznadze effectively reconciles narrative and historical event discussions, emphasizing cause-and-effect relationships. This is not merely a collection of facts, highlighting another merit of Uznadze's discussion on this topic.

Dimitri Uznadze aligns completely with the prevailing opinion in literature that the clash between Caesar and Pompey had a distinct political context. A lengthy quote from the manual is omitted, and the content is summarized:

Uznadze notes that Caesar achieved both goals: the conquest of Gaul and the transformation of his army into a formidable force, instilling confidence in his leadership. This success foreshadowed his future victories. The political landscape became divided into two camps: Caesar, supported by his army, and Pompey, aligned with the Senate. Conflict loomed, and

Pompey aimed to neutralize Caesar's main strength—the army. The Senate demanded Caesar's dismissal, a move tantamount to his death. This fueled the escalating conflict.

Despite the Senate's threats, Caesar marched towards Rome and reached the Rubicon River, the boundary of his proconsul authority. Faced with a challenging choice, he famously crossed the Rubicon, initiating a civil war. Initially, his efforts bore fruit as he gained control over all of Italy. Pompey fled to the east, resulting in a decisive battle at Pharsalus in 48 BC, where Caesar emerged victorious. Pompey sought refuge in Egypt but was killed to win Caesar's favor. Caesar honored Pompey with a grand burial, concluding the power struggle.

It might be desirable to mention that Caesar, in victory, implemented a more lenient policy, avoiding repression. This strategic move endeared him to the people, garnering favorable attitudes.

The subsequent war in Alexandria is mentioned without a specific date (47-46 BC), a choice permissible in a school manual. The absence of a specified date is seen as a matter of taste rather than a principled omission.

Uznadze then discusses Caesar's campaign against Pharnajom (or Farnake), Mithridates' son, re-establishing Roman dominance. The reference to "veni, vidi, vici" reflects Caesar's swift victory.

Returning to the West, Caesar faced strong opposition. The Republican Optimates, led by Cato the Younger, engaged in Africa, while Pompey's sons gathered forces in Spain. Caesar defeated the Republicans, declared Numidia a Roman province, and confronted Cato Jr., who chose death over witnessing the Republic's fall. The Battle of Munda in 45 BC marked the defeat of the last Republican forces, with Caesar returning to Rome victorious.

The mention of the Thapsus battle lacks specificity, reflecting one approach where generality is acceptable. Another approach, emphasizing location (Thapsus) and date (6 January 46 BC), is considered valid. This choice of argument style persists throughout Uznadze's work.

Dimitri Uznadze meticulously addresses not only factual presentation but also emphasizes cause-and-effect relationships in his manual, avoiding a mere accumulation of facts. In a notable excerpt, he explores the reasons behind Rome's shift from a republic to a monarchy. Uznadze attributes this transformation to Rome's expansion as a world state, extensive trade and production, and the resulting economic disparity between different segments of society. The decline of the middle and small landowners led to Marius's army reforms, aligning the fate of the majority with the army leaders. The subsequent struggle between the army and the Senate, depicted as a party struggle, ultimately resulted in the victory of the army and the dominance of its commander-in-chief. This process,

initiated by Marius and continued by Sulla, Pompey, and nearly completed by Caesar, culminated in the establishment of the monarchy, with rulers later known as “emperors.”

Uznadze’s approach to this issue echoes a multi-variant perspective, reflecting pluralism and likely influenced by European, particularly Russian historiography. This nuanced approach aligns with innovations in historical science in the early 20th century, showcasing Uznadze’s commitment to keeping up with evolving scholarly perspectives.

Moving on to the fifth part of the section, Uznadze delves into Caesar’s reforms, emphasizing his role not only as a military leader but also as a statesman, politician, and reformer. Recognizing Caesar’s multifaceted contributions, Uznadze successfully brings attention to the relevance and significance of his political and administrative reforms. The mention of Caesarist regimes not being uniform and the introduction of categories like “Progressive Caesarism” and “Reactionary Caesarism” adds complexity to the analysis, showing a more comprehensive understanding of historical processes. Uznadze also acknowledges alternative perspectives, such as Guillermo Ferrero’s term “democratic imperialism,” and aligns himself more with Antonio Gramsci’s progressive categorization of Caesar’s rule.

The discussion on Caesar’s reforms is positively framed, appreciating the progressiveness and democratic character of his measures. Uznadze notes that unlike Marius and Sulla, Caesar implemented reforms through liberal methods rather than repressions, highlighting the positive aspects of his governance. The section concludes with insights into Caesar’s impact on the political structure, as his image appears on Roman currency, a month is named after him, and he assumes a prominent position in the Senate and ceremonial events. Additionally, Uznadze touches on Caesar’s foreign policy, noting his intention to punish the Parthians, although he could not fulfill this plan.

Towards the end, he explicitly discusses the conspiracy against Caesar and his assassination. He notes that this occurred on March 15, 44 BC. In this case, the date is indicated, and it was the right decision. Ancient authors such as Appian, Suetonius, Plutarch, and historians have detailed this event. He demonstrates considerable awareness in this matter. This, of course, is commendable and is a logical consequence of empirical, factual knowledge of the material. “On March 15, the conspirators surrounded him in the Senate, pretending to ask for something, but their true intention was to carry out the assassination. Casca struck him with the first sword, and when Caesar saw Brutus with a dagger in his hand, he uttered, ‘You too, Brutus,’ and gave up the resistance. The conspirators successfully overpowered Caesar and announced to the people that they were going to execute their plan. The people reacted to this news with hostility.” (1.72)

He elaborates on another achievement of Caesar: the creation of a new calendar (1.70-71) but does not specify a date. Due to the importance of this fact, it would be desirable to indicate the date. This happened in 46 BC. To be more specific, one month of the year was named July in honor of Julius Caesar. (14.260,15.63)

We consider the final part of this section of the manual to be a peculiar summary of Dimitri Uznadze's attitude towards Caesar, where the glorification of Caesar reaches its zenith. As mentioned earlier, Dimitri Uznadze aligns with the opinion prevalent in historical scientific literature and concurs with the assessment of the historian Giro, who extols Caesar's virtues. In this case, Giro Uznadze can be seen as the spokesperson for his views. This is how he positions himself. This is what we read in Dimitri Uznadze's textbook: "Julius Caesar was one of the greatest geniuses, a great writer, an excellent orator, an incomparable general, and a first-rate politician. In a word, Caesar was everything, and history does not know a more talented individual than him. He possessed a strong, clear, and robust mind. Far-sighted and considerate of circumstances, he knew how to formulate broad and magnificent intentions with great speed and had the talent to execute them. Caesar was not content with brilliant victories in the military arena. Although Caesar has passed away, his works endured long after him. He laid the foundations of the Roman Empire, issued laws that remained in force even during the time of Justinian, and, notably, expanded the influence of Roman-Greek culture. Roman education ultimately civilized the barbarians of Gaul and Spain, setting them on the path of cultural development. He accomplished this enormous work in four or five years, dedicating three-quarters of this time to his opposition. The speed and ease of Caesar's work were miraculous. Caesar possessed an amazing charm, and few could escape its influence without being captivated. He was austere by nature and full of honors, and this austerity and honor were the reasons why Caesar treated his enemies with true magnanimity. Surprisingly, extreme circumstances did not necessitate harshness; unlike Sulla, who was known for his ruthlessness. After victory, Octavius, Caesar's successor, was merciless, making Caesar's enduring appeal all the more remarkable. In light of all this, Caesar can be considered an imperfect man in history." (Prof. Giro) (1.66-67. 1.72-73) Further comments may be unnecessary here.

On this significant note, Dimitri Uznadze concludes the coverage of Caesar's work in the first national school textbook of ancient world history. As a first attempt, naturally, it could not be flawless. Further refinement and perfection of some issues, in our opinion, should not be ruled out. The work on the manual did not end there; on the contrary, it was just the beginning. In our opinion, he was in the process of finding the optimal approach to writing the manual. The "Little Golden Age" of Georgian history

turned out to be very short-lived. He simply couldn't manage to complete, refine, and continue working on this manual due to political conflicts. The initiated work remained unfinished. This is the reality, neither embellished nor obscured, and it does not provide us with an adequate understanding of the absurdity of Dimitri Uznadze's views on this matter.

Perhaps we would have made a point here if not for one interesting circumstance, in our opinion. We think we won't be wrong to say that Dimitri Uznadze could be considered the most distinguished person of all time, surpassing even Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Napoleon. It is possible to add someone else to this top three, but it will be challenging to argue with Dimitri Uznadze. He has his version of this issue, which has the right to exist and, undoubtedly, contains a rational grain of truth. That should be the main thing. He has many supporters.

This is one part of his reasoning; he has another, perhaps no less interesting part that it would not be appropriate to ignore. Ignoring it will not provide us with a complete, comprehensive idea of this topic; it would be equivalent to stopping in the middle of the road. It should be interesting to cover the issue in this regard. Who represented Dimitri Uznadze the best in this trio? Who did he think was the leader of the triumvirate? The answer to this question is not difficult; it lies directly on the surface, it is the visible tip of the iceberg, and it is quite transparent. Of course, it is Caesar, who is his favorite hero, to whom he pays special respect. He has his version of the matter, and that is the main thing. This is another positive aspect of his discussion on this topic. We fully share Dimitri Uznadze's opinion that the most outstanding personalities of all time in world history were: Alexander the Great, Gaius Julius Caesar, and Napoleon. However, we present the arrangement of forces within the triumvirate a little differently. In this case, the argument is again a matter of taste and not of a principled nature.

There may be a different opinion; we look at this issue a little differently, which can be considered an alternative. In our subjective opinion, Napoleon can be considered the best of this triumvirate. Here, our sympathy or antipathy has nothing to do with it. Our argumentation is as follows: There is one fundamental difference between them, which, in our opinion, should not be overlooked. Here, of course, we have in mind the fact that if the first two were genetically, by inheritance, connected to the government, we cannot say the same about the third. Alexander the Great was the son of Philip of Macedon and inherited power. We are dealing with a similar situation in relation to Caesar, who was a representative of the aristocratic family of the Julii, always in or near power. Napoleon is entirely different. The son of a Corsican lawyer achieved unprecedented success. At the age of thirty, as a result of the 18 Brumaire (November 9) coup d'état of 1799, he came to power and became the ruler of France, one

of the great powers of Europe. On December 2, 1804, he was crowned emperor. In 1807, after the Treaty of Tilsit, he controlled almost all of Europe. Prince Kurakin reported to Emperor Alexander I that “from the Pyrenees to the Oder, from the Sound to the Straits of Messina, everything is France.” (19.152).

There may be another version; some would think that Alexander the Great should be in that position. This has its own reason and meaning, and we do not see anything unacceptable in it. He was not just a conqueror; he founded the new Hellenistic civilization. There will always be a difference of opinion on this issue, it will continue for a long time, and probably will not end. “History is a never-ending polemic.” All three opinions will have their supporters, and there are many of them, but reaching a consensus among them will not be easy and probably not necessary. Is this consensus necessary? History is not dominated by one truth; it would be equivalent to its death.

Thus, summarizing all the above, we think an interesting picture emerges. As already said, Dimitri Uznadze’s positive assessment of Caesar’s work must be entirely correct and, without a doubt, contains a rational grain of truth. This appears to be a positive side of his reasoning on this topic. This, of course, is very good, but the excessive glorification and praise of Caesar probably still require great caution and may be excessive. Naturally, a question arises: Did not Dimitri Uznadze go a little too far? This can become a subject of scientific research. Some believe that yes, and some, on the contrary, no. Achieving a consensus among them will not be easy and probably not necessary.

In the present paper, we tried to identify the highlights and shadows of the coverage of Caesar’s work in Dimitri Uznadze’s textbook and explain their causes. This section of the manual is obviously interesting, and it has to be said that it has more positives than negatives. A nihilistic attitude towards this passage would not be appropriate.

There can be no two opinions regarding the fact that Dimitri Uznadze seems to be well-versed in Caesar’s life and work, which echoes his knowledge of empirical, factual material. This is one plus of his discussion on this topic. The coverage of Caesar’s work in the textbook is closely related genetically to his assessment; they mutually influence each other. We cannot separate them from each other. In our opinion, this would not be correct.

Dimitri Uznadze cannot hide his admiration for Caesar’s work and gives him great respect. He should be considered among the pro-Caesar historians. This, we think, is quite transparent and beyond any doubt. Empirical,

factual knowledge of the material and a correct, scientific approach to Caesar's work are the main virtues of Dimitri Uznadze's discussion on this issue. The importance of his discussion on this topic, we think, should lie in this. This, of course, was not accidental and must have been due to two circumstances. Let's start with the fact that, first of all, we should see in it an echo of the free thinking of the democratic environment that existed in independent Georgia from 1918 to 1921. Second, we think that it would fully correspond to the strict requirements of the historical science of the beginning of the 20th century and echoed European and, first of all, Russian historiography. Here the real situation was reflected. Dimitri Uznadze tries not to lag behind and keep up with the innovations and innovations that happened in historical science in the first years of the last century. This is obviously very good.

We think there is a reason to assert that initially, when evaluating Caesar's work, Georgian historiography should have set a correct, scientific, and accurate course. This was manifested in the fact that emphasis was placed on free thinking, a multivariate approach to historical events, pluralism, and progressive-liberal views. In fact, we are dealing with a scientific approach to the issue, which naturally has its strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the indifferent attitude towards Dimitri Uznadze's reasoning on this topic, as it was in the Soviet years, should not be replaced by an apologetic approach. We should not go from one extreme to the other. Both extremes are unacceptable. We have tried to find a middle way that will allow us to highlight both the light and the shadow and, as far as possible, try to find out what causes it. This seems to be a scientific approach to the issue.

Dimitri Uznadze, while evaluating Caesar's work, shared the opinion spread in the scientific literature and gave a positive assessment to Caesar's work. He thought quite highly of it. He paid special respect to him. There was no one like him in the history of the world. He, like European historians, criticizes him. Such an exaggerated tone, obviously, is not accidental and could be due to two circumstances. It seems that Caesar's work was perfectly in line with his political ideal, and he must have been well aware of the role of the individual in history. Dimitri Uznadze's attitude towards Caesar is very emotional and saturated with sympathy for the Roman politician. Dimitri Uznadze may have gone too far, but his approach to Caesar's work must be very close to the truth and is completely acceptable. That should be the main thing.

In the form of Dimitri Uznadze, we are dealing with one of the prominent representatives and recognized leaders of the Georgian Caesarism or Caesarism as you like. He should be considered in the camp of pro-Caesar historians. Together with Alexander Tsereteli, he laid the foundation for the glorification of Caesar, deep respect, and a sense of piety in Georgian

historiography. He spares no compliments to Caesar and considers his work only in a positive context. The rest simply does not fit into the frame. We will not exaggerate if we say that Caesar is Dimitri Uznadze's favorite hero, who, in his opinion, has no equal in world history. He is the best of the best, the highest.

The benevolent attitude towards Caesar, which was observed in Georgian historiography before the Sovietization, was replaced by a rigid approach after the Sovietization of Georgia. This was not accidental and, of course, must be associated with a restrained attitude towards the role of the individual in history. Georgian historiography of the post-Soviet period tries to restore and develop the original approach.

This is how Dimitri Uznadze's First National School Textbook of Ancient World History describes the highlights of Caesar's work and its causes.

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